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ABSTRACT
Since the appearance of John Locke's Epistola de 
Tolerantia, toleration has been commonly understood to be 
one of the central tenets of liberalism. However, while the 
relationship between toleration and liberalism has been 
studied previously, these studies have not been grounded in 
an adequate exploration of the concept of toleration itself. 
This thesis examines the concept of "toleration" in ordinary 
usage as a means to obtain a deeper understanding both of 
toleration and of its relationship with liberalism.
This examination reveals two key components. First, 
toleration implies two boundaries: to tolerate x is both to
disapprove of x, on the one hand, and to say that x should 
nevertheless be permitted, on the other. Second, while "to 
tolerate" can be a passive act, # "to be tolerant" can also 
imply the possession of a specific virtue and character: 
thus, a tolerant citizenry can be an active citizenry with a 
specific ("tolerant") character.
While advocates of a thin "permissiveness" and a thick 
"authoritarianism" appear to advocate polar opposite 
political positions, many authors in both camps hold that 
their views are compatible with liberalism. This thesis, 
however, will argue that both are incompatible with 
liberalism because neither guarantees the two boundaries of 
toleration, and neither requires an active conception of 
citizenship. Furthermore, this thesis will examine what a 
political order would look like if it were to be "tolerant" 
in both of the required senses.
vi
LIBERALISM AND TOLERATION 
COMPETING CONCEPTS OF TOLERATION IN LIBERAL THOUGHT
Introduction
The era of the Enlightenment provided the genesis for a 
new conception of the good: liberalism. The emergence of
liberalism created a new philosophy which formed the 
underpinnings of a new foundation for the Western World. A 
philosophy based on reason, liberty, and toleration, 
liberalism promised to free man from the tyranny to which he 
had been subjected throughout history. John Locke's Epistola 
de Tolerantia established toleration as a central concept of 
liberal thought. Although reason and liberty are also 
important components of liberalism, this paper will focus 
exclusively on toleration. This focus is warranted because, 
although the relationship between toleration and liberalism 
appears to be straightforward, there are different concepts 
of toleration, and these different concepts contain 
important implications for liberalism.
The relationship between toleration and liberalism has 
been examined previously, but these interpretations have not 
adequately explored the meaning and usage of toleration in 
liberalism. An examination and interpretation of the range 
of uses of "toleration" in ordinary usage yields a deeper 
understanding of its relationship with liberalism. An 
examination of usage, moreover, allows us to examine the
2
3moral and political assumptions that are embedded in our own 
language. An examination of this type reveals the two key
components of toleration in liberal thought. A concept of 
toleration, if it is to be compatible with liberalism, must 
contain both (1) boundaries of "tolerance", and (2) an
active conception of citizenship. Two concepts of 
toleration, a thin "permissiveness" and thick 
"authoritarianism", are polar opposite political positions 
that are often held to be compatible with liberalism. This 
paper, however, will argue that they are not compatible
because neither guarantees both boundaries of toleration and 
an active conception of citizenship. I will begin by 
analyzing three dimensions of toleration--passiveness, 
boundaries, and activeness. This paper concludes with an
examination of what a liberal political order would look 
like if it were to be "tolerant" in both of the required 
senses.
SECTION ONE: 
Defining Toleration
CHAPTER I 
The Passive Dimension
The first task required in an examination of different 
concepts of toleration in liberal thought is to define 
"toleration". The plethora of definitions and variegated 
usage contributes to the confusion concerning the ■ role of 
toleration in liberalism. This examination of toleration 
will reveal the assumptions and distinctions deeply embedded 
in the culture of the liberal tradition. In this section I 
will show: (1) the boundaries which are necessary in order
to create a "range" of toleration, and (2) the components of 
an "active" conception of citizenship. This examination 
necessitates an exhaustive list of definitions describing 
the usage of toleration. For this, we turn to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, as it is here that any usage of the term 
is likely to be found.
Sometimes toleration can be tied to passivity and 
agnosticism. The definition of the verb "tolerate" is: "To
endure, sustain (pain or hardship) . 1,1 The essence of this
^ .A . Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, eds., The Oxford English Dictionary: Second Edition,
Volume XVIII (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 200.
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5definition reveals that the act of toleration represents a 
passive physical act. While this definition does assist in 
clarifying the act of toleration, it does not explain much 
concerning its relationship with liberalism, as toleration 
entails some modicum of disapproval and active restraint.
The second definition of "tolerate" contains a clearer 
connection to liberalism. This entry defines toleration as: 
"To allow to exist or to be done or practised without 
authoritative interference or molestation."2 According to 
this definition, to tolerate "X", one can be agnostic as to 
the desirability of "X". All that is required is for a 
person, state, society, etc. to allow "X": "to be done or
practised without authoritative interference or 
molestation." While this definition reveals how toleration 
can require active restraint, it does not indicate any 
disapproval as to the desirability of "X". Thus, according 
to this definition, the act of toleration allows one to be 
agnostic as to what is being tolerated.
However, toleration does not necessarily include 
agnosticism because "to tolerate" X also means that X is in 
some sense wrong or bad (even though I for some reason 
choose not to ban or suppress X) . Thus toleration, as it 
relates to liberalism, entails at least some level of 
disapproval. An example of this disapproval is the 
conventional attitude toward homosexuality. To say that we
2OEP 200.
6"tolerate" homosexuality implies that it is wrong, as we do
not tolerate heterosexuality. A polis which does not have
any moral qualms about homosexuality would not have a need
to "tolerate" it. Liberalism allows for competing
conceptions of the good, especially ones which are
antipodal. Thus toleration implies that what is being
tolerated is in some way wrong, but not so heinous as to be
proscribed. This is why toleration is necessary in liberal
thought, and this also contributes to the difficulty of
defining toleration. As Mendus points out:
[I] t is nevertheless true that amongst the most 
problematic cases of toleration are those which 
what is tolerated is believed to be morally wrong 
(not merely disliked) and where it is held that
there are no compensating virtues associated with 
the thing being tolerated.3
This usage reveals the tricky relationship between
toleration and liberalism. It involves understanding why
conceptions of the good, X (e.g. homosexuality), must be
tolerated even though they are deemed to be morally wrong,
while in other conceptions of the good, X may be deemed
"intolerable". Yet both may be a usage of toleration in the
"liberal" sense. This confusion leads us to the next usage
section, which examines the varying boundaries implicit in
liberal thought.
This examination of usage reveals some possible
implications of toleration when it is used in liberal
3Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press International, Inc., 1989) 18.
7thought. These definitions tell us that the act of 
toleration can be a "passive act" which requires "non­
interference" . Toleration, according to this usage, is a 
passive act which requires active restraint. The concept of 
toleration becomes increasingly complicated when it is used 
in relation to liberal thought, and as widely varying uses 
of toleration are encountered. The multiple uses reveal the 
complex relationship between toleration and liberalism. One 
usage of toleration may be much more restrictive than 
another, yet both are deemed "liberal". This complexity 
leads us to the next step, examining the boundaries of 
toleration. These definitions and uses of toleration which 
we have examined provide a broad foundation for the concept 
of toleration as it relates to liberalism, but the usage of 
toleration in liberalism also entails boundaries.
CHAPTER II
Defining Toleration:
Boundaries and the Range of Tolerance
The definitions of toleration examined thus far require 
"endurance" and "non-interference" of something which may be 
disapproved of, even including something believed to be 
morally wrong. This definition is not particularly 
compatible with liberalism, for while there are many 
conceptions of the good that are in disagreement, there are 
some which may be proscribed even in a liberal society. 
Therefore a concept of toleration which is compatible with 
liberalism is required to contain this component of 
proscription. It must contain the elements of "endurance" 
and "non-interference", but there must also be some limit as 
to what will be tolerated. Thus, as we shall see, a viable 
concept of toleration will contain the element of non­
interference, and also contain limits, or boundaries. This 
usage of toleration can be illustrated by examining the 
technical definition of "tolerance".
The creation of a range of "tolerance" requires two 
boundaries, and the definition of "tolerance" in its 
technical usage is analogous to this concept. One definition 
of the technical use of "tolerance" in the Oxford English
8
9Dictionary defines tolerance as: "a limit laid down for the
permitted variation of a parameter of a product."4 To 
illustrate this the Oxford English Dictionary applies this 
definition in the manufacturing of coins. "The small margin 
within which coins, when minted, are allowed to deviate from 
the standard fineness and weight."5 This creates a range of 
acceptable variation. Anything which falls within- this 
range, while not perfect, must be tolerated. This concept is 
analogous to the usage of toleration in liberalism. 
Toleration contains boundaries, and as long as particular 
conceptions of the good fall within these boundaries, then 
citizens of a liberal state are required to tolerate them. 
This range of "tolerance" comprises an essential component 
in this concept of toleration. The method by which the 
parameters of coin production are created are of course 
different from how the boundaries for conceptions of the 
good are created. Therefore the implications of this usage 
of toleration needs to be examined.
A compatible concept of toleration does not require 
unlimited "endurance" of something which is disapproved of 
or morally wrong. This is because liberalism does not 
require that any action or behavior be tolerated. Obviously 
an action which is illegal in a liberal state will not be 
tolerated, but there are conceptions of the good which, 
while not illegal, may be proscribed. It is possible for
4OED 200.
5OED 200.
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liberalism to proscribe a particular conception of the good, 
thus "interfering", and still be "tolerant". An example of 
this may be religious beliefs, such as those practiced by 
Christian Scientists. Their conception of the good includes 
the belief of healing through prayer, but this is often 
interfered with by the liberal state, such as when the 
welfare of their child is thought to be endangered. This 
example may create an appearance of incompatibility between 
toleration and liberal thought; but this apparent 
contradiction is permitted because the concept of toleration 
which is essential to liberal thought contains boundaries.
The concept of toleration which is most compatible with 
liberalism actually contains two boundaries. The definition 
of toleration which we examined requires "endurance" and 
"non-interference" of a disapproved of act. The first 
boundary of toleration therefore requires allowing a 
particular conception of the good, which may not be 
desirable, to be tolerated and not outright banned. This is 
an essential component of the relationship between 
toleration and liberalism. As liberalism contends that a 
rational man may decide what is the best conception of the 
good for himself, toleration requires that competing 
conceptions of the good must be tolerated. They may not be 
desirable, but they are not proscribed, and thus they must 
be tolerated. The first boundary allows competing 
conceptions of the good to be tolerated, and the second
11
boundary provides the demarcation at which a conception is, 
or becomes, intolerable. Proscribed conceptions are not 
viewed as legitimate; they may have been legitimate, but 
have been taken to an extreme and are no longer acceptable. 
This demarcation may be viewed as the outer boundary of 
toleration in liberal thought. As stated previously, 
liberalism does not require every conception of the good to 
be viewed as legitimate. Therefore toleration in liberal 
thought does not require unqualified acceptance, but rather 
limits, boundaries that establish the range of "tolerance" 
within liberalism.
The range of tolerance created by these boundaries is 
essential to liberalism. Liberal thought, while it does 
allow rational men to decide for themselves what is good, 
does not permit everything. The boundaries establish a range 
of toleration, not an unqualified toleration which many 
believe to be compatible with liberalism. The first boundary 
permits what is not regarded as "universally" good (e.g. 
homosexuality), although deemed a legitimate conception of 
the good, to compete with other conceptions of the good. The 
second boundary excludes those conceptions of the good which 
are taken to extremes or are not legitimate to begin with. 
Any conception of the good, once it is outside the second 
boundary (however defined), is intolerable. The result of 
this concept of toleration is that a range of toleration is 
established. As we examined previously, toleration entails
12
some modicum of disapproval, therefore everything within 
this range is not universally "good". Thus, although a 
conception of the good may be disapproved of, it must be 
tolerated if it falls within this range, within these two 
boundaries.
This usage of toleration which we have examined entails 
limits, or boundaries. Analogous to the technical definition 
of tolerance, a range of "tolerance" is created through the 
construction of parameters. The method by which the 
boundaries of toleration are created has important 
implications, particularly for its compatibility with 
liberalism. Because of these implications it is necessary 
for us to examine different concepts of toleration in 
liberal thought. While the necessity of boundaries may be 
established, the extent of these boundaries, and their 
construction, still needs to be examined.
CHAPTER III
Defining Toleration:
The Active Dimension
The idea that to be "tolerant" can be an "active", 
sustained practice, is the second required component of 
toleration. The definitions we examined previously defined 
toleration as a "passive" act, consisting of "endurance" and 
"non-interference". These definitions were shown to be 
inadequate as toleration, in a liberal sense, entails some 
level of disapproval (e.g. homosexuality). We now turn our 
focus to how these boundaries are established. I will argue 
that in order for a concept of toleration to be compatible 
with liberalism the boundaries need to be constructed 
through democratic discourse. This discourse will in turn 
foster and contribute, in some significant sense, to the 
"tolerant" character of the citizens.
This component of "active" toleration requires, in 
part: a disposition to be patient with, or indulgent of,
others; and a freedom from bigotry and forbearance.6 An 
active toleration will therefore require citizens to 
tolerate competing conceptions of the good which are within 
the boundaries, or range, of "tolerance". Unlike the other
6OEP. 200.
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two concepts of toleration (permissiveness and 
authoritarianism), in an active ' concept of toleration
competing conceptions of the good will not just be
"endured", but will help create a dialogue concerning the 
boundaries of toleration. The experience of living in a 
tolerant environment and engaging in this democratic
dialogue will lead to "tolerance" constituting a significant 
part of a citizen's character. This concept is analogous to 
how people develop a "tolerance" to a drug. Some people may 
already have tolerances of this sort, but in most people
they must be developed. Most people have to be exposed to 
the drug in order to develop a tolerance for it, as 
"tolerance" is not an inherent characteristic. Likewise, if 
people are not exposed to toleration it is unlikely they 
will develop it, and thus will not tolerate competing 
conceptions of the good. Therefore a citizen must be able to 
engage and be "active" in the democratic debate to negotiate 
the range of "tolerance", and thus reinforce this liberal 
virtue.
The boundaries created by this concept of an "active" 
toleration are obviously not arrived at deus ex machina, but 
are rather formed by "active" discourse and debate. 
Therefore a system, or method, for this discourse is 
required. This is one reason why democracy is compatible 
with this concept of toleration. Public discourse and debate 
are essential to a democratic regime, and the creation of
15
the limits of toleration is a part of the discourse. This 
democratic discourse creates a method through which an 
"active" toleration may operate and negotiate the boundaries 
of toleration.
The component of "active" toleration is uniquely 
compatible with democracy. The democratic characteristics of 
a liberal state provides the structure for public discourse 
to debate competing conceptions of the good. Practitioners 
of "active" toleration democratically debate competing 
conceptions of the good, and create a range of "tolerance" 
which is continually changing. This "active" concept of 
toleration thus requires a sustained democratic discourse 
through which the boundaries are negotiated. Therefore, a 
democratic state provides the method and structure necessary 
for an "active" toleration.
The democratic discourse which is necessary to create a 
range of "tolerance" leads to the second part of this 
"active" component of toleration. The method by which these 
boundaries of toleration are formed necessitates that 
citizens be able to practice and engage in this discourse. 
This results in the creation of toleration as a "liberal" 
virtue. As the first component of this "active" toleration 
will continually re-negotiate the range of "tolerance", 
citizens must be able to participate and sustain democratic 
debate. This democratic debate which negotiates the range of 
"tolerance" must constitute their character in some
16
significant sense through living in this environment. Thus, 
for an "active" toleration to continue to exist, this 
tolerant characteristic must be cultivated. This idea 
comprises the second part of this "active" toleration, and 
is connected with the first. The creation of a range of
"tolerance" through an active, sustained practice transforms 
toleration into a necessary virtue of the liberal character, 
a virtue which needs to be exercised if it is to be
developed.
The first dimension which we examined, boundaries, 
creates a range of "tolerance" via democratic discourse. If 
this discourse is sustained it becomes part of the liberal 
character and is dependent upon the second dimension, an 
"active" citizenship. The democratic discourse creates 
"tolerance" as a virtue, which must be continually exercised 
if democratic discourse is to be sustained. In order for
this method through which the boundaries of toleration are 
created (i.e. an active democratic discourse) to survive, an 
"active" component must ensure that citizens in a liberal
society have the capacity to engage in this democratic 
discourse. Thus this virtue of "tolerance" must be 
cultivated as a characteristic of the polis. Perhaps neither 
the individual belonging to a thin "permissive" nor thick 
"authoritarian" society can contain this virtue, this 
"tolerance", as neither lives in an environment of sustained 
democratic dialogue concerning the boundaries of toleration.
17
Thus it appears that these two components are 
interdependent. A sustained democratic debate is required to 
nurture this liberal virtue and create boundaries, thus this 
liberal virtue is necessary for the debate to remain viable.
In summary, these two components are necessary for a 
concept of toleration to be uniquely compatible with 
liberalism. The method through which the range of 
"tolerance" is established, a sustained democratic dialogue, 
reinforces and fosters tolerance in the citizens of the 
political community. The boundaries create a "range" of 
toleration which places limits on particular conceptions of 
the good. The necessity of these two components becomes 
clearer when placed on a continuum with two competing 
concepts of toleration in liberal thought. At one end of the 
continuum is a "permissive" liberalism, which contains a 
broader conception of toleration; and at the other end of 
the spectrum is an "authoritarian" concept of toleration.
SECTION TWO
Two Concents of Toleration:
Permissiveness and Authoritarianism
There are two competing concepts of toleration in the 
liberal tradition which are relevant to this examination. 
These two concepts, permissiveness and authoritarianism, are 
best examined when placed on opposite ends of a continuum. 
The concept of toleration at one end, "permissiveness", is 
most closely identified with John Stuart Mill and commonly 
promoted by libertarians. The toleration which Mill espouses 
in his seminal work, On Liberty, is believed to be a concept 
of toleration which is the least restrictive of individual 
liberty, and thus most compatible with liberalism. The basic 
tenet of this concept holds that there are no limits to 
toleration, save one, the "harm" principle. An examination 
of this concept of toleration reveals that this position 
does not create a "tolerant society", as it lacks an active 
democratic discourse which we have seen is necessary to 
create viable boundaries of toleration. The "permissive" 
society, I will argue, is not a "tolerant" society due to 
the absence of this active component.
The second concept of toleration at the opposite end of 
the continuum is a much more restrictive one. While there is
18
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no single author associated with this extreme, if some of 
the characteristics of Locke's Epistola de Tolerantia /were 
emphasized, it would create a restrictive, or "thick" 
concept of toleration. While this concept of toleration is 
extremely limited, it does allow for some competing
conceptions of the good. This authoritarian concept of 
toleration also lacks an active component, which contributes 
to the narrowness of its boundaries of toleration. An 
examination of these two concepts of toleration, at the 
opposite ends of this continuum, will reveal their
deficiencies in creating viable concepts of toleration which 
are compatible with liberal thought.
CHAPTER IV
''Thin" Liberalism:
Permissiveness
The prevalent approach in contemporary liberal thought
represented at one end of the continuum may be described as
a "thin" liberalism. The term "thin" is applicable as it
requires minimal obligations from citizens to the political
community. The thinker associated with the components of
this "thin" liberalism is John Stuart Mill. This philosophy
may be understood to be akin to libertarianism. The crucial
deficiency of this "thin" liberalism is that it lacks an
active component and thus inadequately defines the limits of
toleration. This deficiency is due to "thin" liberalism's
essential elements: liberty and neutrality. An analysis of
the components of "thin" liberalism, Mill's harm principle
and neutrality, will reveal why it is an inadequate concept
of toleration and ill-suited for liberalism.
The concept of liberty is the cornerstone of Mill's
thought and an essential component of "thin" liberalism. The
liberty of the individual is paramount. As Gray explains:
[T]he Principle of Liberty presupposes the
classical liberal principle prescribing the
greatest possible equal freedom. For, if the
principle is accepted, no man may abridge
20
21
another's freedom unless there is a justification 
for such abridgment in terms of harm.7
Thus the restriction of liberty is only justified in terms 
of harm. As Mendus explains: "Harm - specifically harm to
others - is the sole warrant for government interference in 
Mill's opinion."8 This concept of the harm principle leads to 
the problem of defining "harm" . If harm is the limit of 
government and society, then it must be accurately defined. 
But as Mendus points out, "Mill's principle is open to a 
multitude of interpretations, many of them inconsistent with 
one another, and some of them illiberal in their 
implications."9 While it may be futile to interpret what Mill 
meant by harm, this principle does have implications for the 
limits of toleration.
The essential element of liberty in "thin" liberalism 
is limited by the "harm principle". No person or entity may 
trespass on one's liberty except in the case of harm, 
however defined. As Gray explains: "Once the harm-prevention
barrier is crossed, however, restricting liberty is in 
principle allowable."10 This idea also indicates the limits 
of toleration in a "thin" liberalism. If liberty is broadly 
extended, and only limited by the harm principle, it 
logically follows that toleration is broadly extended; in 
fact, it appears that the same limits apply. One must
7John Gray, Mill On Liberty (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) 59.
8Mendus. Toleration 121.
9Mendus. Toleration 121.
10Gray, Mill On Liberty 59.
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tolerate any idea or action by another individual unless it 
is harmful. The reason for toleration, according to this 
principle, is nothing more than reciprocity. It is in 
essence saying, 'I will tolerate you (unless what you're 
doing is harmful), and in return you must tolerate me. ' This 
is why it is a "thin" liberalism; its obligations are 
minimal (reciprocity), and its boundaries are designated 
unconditionally by this rule. Just as the limits of liberty 
are prescribed by the harm principle, the limits of 
toleration are likewise. This introduces the second 
component of "thin" liberalism: neutrality.
According to a "thin" liberalism, forcing an individual 
to do something against his or her will, even though 
beneficial, would be a violation of their liberty. Therefore 
a "thin" liberalism is required to be "neutral" in regards 
to conceptions of the good. Advocating a conception of the 
good may infringe on an individual's liberty, and as 
explained previously, infringement may only be done to 
protect a person from harm. The example of homosexuality may 
shed some light on the complexity and ambiguity of this 
concept. If the state is to be neutral in regards to 
conceptions of the good, then it can not take a position on 
homosexuality. But if an individual living next to a 
homosexual household believes that the homosexual lifestyle 
is harmful, does he have the right to prevent his neighbors 
from engaging in an act which he believes is harmful, and
23
thus violate there liberty? Furthermore, if he believes that 
by having neighbors who practice homosexuality he, his 
family, and neighborhood are harmed, is the state then 
responsible to protect him from this perceived harm? If 
protection from his perceived harm dictates, does this 
restrict the liberty of his homosexual neighbors? And if he 
is not protected from his perceived harm, is his liberty 
restricted? The complexities and contradictions which this 
example point out underscore the simplicity which attracts 
supporters to this concept of a "thin" liberalism. As 
Galston explains, this "thin" liberalism "is desirable not 
because it promotes a specific way of life but precisely 
because it alone does not do so. The liberal state is 
'neutral' among different ways of life."11 Proponents of this 
"thin" liberalism "assert that liberalism rejects - and can 
get along without - any substantive theory of the good as a 
determinate end for human endeavor."12 Thus by advocating 
neutrality among competing conceptions of the good as a way 
to maintain liberty, proponents of this "thin" liberalism 
fail to see the contradictions which this concept entails. 
For in this "thin" liberalism the "principle of neutrality 
denies...the legitimacy of assuming a single, correct 
conception of the good. 1,13 Thus if something is not harmful
^William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 80.
12Galston, Liberal Purposes 81.
13Mendus, Toleration 132.
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then it must be tolerated, and the only justification for 
this toleration appears to be reciprocity.
The component of neutrality is also significant in 
regards to toleration in a "thin" liberalism. This component 
requires that the state, society, and individuals must be 
agnostic concerning the conception of the good. As Mendus 
explains, "The reason for this is that, whilst many 
political doctrines may avoid foundation in a single 
conception of the good, liberalism is often characterized by 
its overt commitment to a plurality of goods."14 Thus the 
component of neutrality in a "thin" liberalism has a 
significant impact on this conception of toleration.
The neutrality required by a "thin" liberalism creates 
a society which does not advocate values, for it must be 
neutral towards conceptions of the good. Values betray a 
belief in a certain conception of the good, for something 
which is 'valued' is believed to be 'good' . This lack of 
values (which is required by the neutrality principle), in 
turn creates a permissive society, not a tolerant one. The 
variable of values is not relevant, for values are 
proscribed. The important question becomes- what is to be 
permitted? The concept of toleration is itself value laden, 
for the language of toleration is the language of right and 
wrong, and toleration requires one to "endure" what one 
believes is wrong.
*4Mendus, Toleration 133.
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An individual may be pursuing a conception of the good 
which you find morally wrong {e.g. homosexuality), but in a 
liberal society you must "tolerate" it. Our previous 
examination of the passive definition of toleration supports 
this, for as Nicholson states; "Toleration is the virtue of 
refraining from exercising one's power with regard to 
other's opinion or action although one morally disapproves 
of it."15 This is the essence of toleration in a "thin" 
liberalism.
The problem with this passivity is that toleration is 
itself a "virtue", which in turn is a conception of the 
good. To advocate tolerance is to advocate a certain 
conception of the good. A "thin" liberalism must be neutral, 
agnostic, towards conceptions of the good. If being tolerant 
is seen as a virtue in a liberal society, then it cannot be 
advocated. Thus citizens of a "thin" liberalism need not 
practice tolerance, for being tolerant will advocate a 
certain conception of the good, and will interfere with 
liberty. Thus Mill's "concept of "thin" liberalism lacks the 
active component of toleration. The boundaries are 
established deus ex machina by the harm principle and 
neutrality. Thus there is no democratic discourse which 
continually re-negotiates these boundaries. Furthermore, as 
we have seen, Mill lacks a means (e.g. democratic discourse) 
to adequately define and continually re-negotiate the
15Peter P. Nicholson, “Toleration as a moral ideal,” in Aspects of Toleration. John Horton and 
Susan Mendus, eds. (New York: Methuen & Co., 1985) 162.
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meaning of harm. Tolerance thus does not become a part of 
the character of a citizen of this liberal state, for 
tolerance is not required, only permissiveness. Due to the 
absence of this active component, as long as an individual 
is not violating the harm principle (and intolerance is not 
deemed "harmful"), citizens may be as intolerant as they 
please.
This analysis of a "thin" liberalism reveals why this
concept of toleration does not create a "tolerant" society,
but a "permissive" society. Anything which is not deemed as 
"harmful" is allowed, for anything less than this would 
restrict liberty; and the protection of individual liberty 
is paramount. The second component, neutrality, gives Mill 
the pretense of being objective. Neutrality does not allow 
toleration, for toleration is seen as a value, a conception 
of the good. Neutrality requires that the state, society, 
and the individual be agnostic towards conceptions of the 
good, for fear that advocating a particular conception will 
restrict another's liberty. But by employing neutrality and 
the harm principle as the means to protect liberty
toleration is no longer applicable. The example of the
homosexual neighbor reveals the contradictions of this 
position. Who is being "harmed", and whose liberty is being 
restricted cannot be clearly discerned. This is because
toleration is a certain conception of the good, and a "thin" 
liberalism must be agnostic towards conceptions of the good,
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whether homosexuality or heterosexuality. This neutrality of 
a "thin" liberalism thus creates nothing more than a 
permissive, or laissez-faire, liberalism.
The definitions of toleration and their usage we 
examined in the first section indicate that this concept of 
liberalism may only contain (if any at all) a "passive" 
toleration - one which requires "endurance" and "non­
interference". The active component is completely lacking, 
which prohibits democratic discourse concerning the 
boundaries of toleration and denies toleration from becoming 
a significant component of a citizen's character. The end 
result of this "thin" liberalism is that there is no place 
for toleration, as the boundaries which are created by these 
two components of harm and neutrality are too vague and 
expansive to be meaningful; for according to these 
components, nothing can be tolerated, and (almost) 
everything must be permitted.
CHAPTER V
"Thick" Liberalism:
Authoritarianism
The concept of toleration advocated by Mill has been 
shown to be a "permissive" concept of toleration. This 
"thin" liberalism is opposed on the other end of the 
continuum by a concept of toleration which is understood to 
be a "thick" liberalism. This concept of toleration creates 
a much more restrictive range of "tolerance". While there is 
no particular author who is associated with this position, 
the elements of a "thick" liberalism may be understood if we 
examine certain parts of Locke's Epistola de Tolerantia. 
Although Locke's thoughts concerning toleration were radical 
for its time and essential to the growth of liberal thought, 
his views are nonetheless dated and thus restricted in their 
scope. Therefore I will use his Letter to illustrate the 
elements of a concept of toleration contained in a "thick" 
liberalism.
The concept of toleration discussed in Locke's Letter 
is drastically more restrictive than that of Mill's. It 
does, however, contain a guiding principle similar to Mill's 
"harm" principle. The guiding principle in this concept is 
order instead of harm. Whereas "thin" liberalism creates a
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range of toleration too vague, "thick" liberalism utilizes 
"order" to create a range of "tolerance" which is too 
restrictive.
The crux of the "order" principle is that "disorder"
may undermine the state and society, and this is deemed
intolerable. Specifically, in the case of Locke, any
religion which does not practice monotheism, worships a
foreign prince (Catholicism), or worst of all, denies the
existence of God, is a threat to civil order. Atheists are a
threat to civil order because: "Covenants, and Oath's, which
are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon the
atheist."16 While Locke did advocate toleration for non-
Christian religions, his definition of toleration (guided by
the order principle) is too narrow. Toleration was not
extended to atheism and Catholicism, or polytheistic
religions. Thus, while people had to "endure" a religious
practice which they thought may be incorrect, they did not
have to endure something believed to be morally wrong. Locke
creates a range of tolerance, guided by the order principle,
which is very narrow. As a result of this narrow range of
"tolerance" no one is expected to tolerate what he or she
believes to be morally wrong. Locke uses this as an argument
why Christians should tolerate non-Christians:
Things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by 
any human Authority, be made any part of the 
worship of God; for this very reason they are 
indifferent. For since indifferent things are not
16Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Co., 1983) 51.
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capable, by any Virtue of their own, to propiate 
the Deity; no human Power or Authority can confer 
on them so much dignity and' Excellence as to 
enable them to do it.17
Locke is arguing that toleration of non-Christians is 
acceptable, as monotheistic religions (excepting 
Catholicism) cannot be, in a sense, morally wrong. The range 
of "tolerance" is thus so restrictive as to be de facto non­
existent. This concept of toleration, guided by the non- 
negotiable "order" principle, thus lacks an adequate range 
of "tolerance" which allows for conceptions of the good to 
compete.
The result of this restricted range of "tolerance" is a 
concept of toleration which is ill-suited for liberalism. 
Similar to the "thin" liberalism, this "thick" liberalism 
lacks an "active" component which creates the boundaries of 
toleration. The lack of a sustained democratic discourse is 
the result of the "order" principle. No debate on the 
boundaries is allowed because they are mandated by this
principle (however interpreted). Thus, similar to "thin" 
liberalism, the boundaries are established dues ex machina
and are non-negotiable. The ramification of these components
of "thick" liberalism is the creation of a concept of
toleration which, while still liberal, is ill-suited for 
liberalism.
As I have argued, the "thin" liberalism and "thick" 
liberalism contain deficiencies that create concepts of
17Locke, A Letter 40.
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toleration which, while containing liberal aspects and 
characteristics, are incompletely liberal. While both 
contain boundaries which demarcate what is to be tolerated 
and what is intolerable, analogous to the parameters of a 
coin, neither concept contains an "active" component. In the 
previous examination of usage I illustrated that toleration 
has a passive component, which entails "non-interference" 
with something which is disapproved of. There is also an 
active component to toleration. This "active" component is 
not only necessary in the creation of these boundaries, but 
also is necessary for the creation of a "tolerant" citizen. 
Thus, in summary, the deficiencies resulting in the lack of 
an "active" component in a "thin" and "thick" liberalism' 
creates two distinct concepts of toleration which are 
incompatible with liberalism.
SECTION THREE:
A Complete Concept
CHAPTER VI
Toleration and a Middle Concept of Liberalism
The concept of liberalism for which I have been arguing 
is radically different from the two concepts previously 
discussed. The two components of this concept of liberalism 
provide (1) boundaries, and (2) a method through which the 
limits of toleration may be defined and negotiated. This is 
necessary because to create a truly liberal society (as 
opposed to a permissive or authoritarian), the boundaries of 
toleration cannot be established deus ex machina. This 
middle concept uses the democratic framework of a liberal 
state to negotiate and maintain a sustained discourse 
concerning the limits of toleration: the range of tolerance.
The boundaries of toleration will be drawn from, and 
influenced by, the conventions, traditions, and customs of 
the society and culture. Furthermore, these boundaries will 
not be static, as they are in "permissiveness" and 
"authoritarianism". The sustained democratic discourse will 
create boundaries which are continually evolving and being 
re-negotiated.
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The result of these two components is a concept of 
liberalism where "tolerance" will itself become a liberal 
virtue. The democratic debate requires that toleration 
constitutes in some significant sense the character of a 
"tolerant" citizen. A citizen in a "permissive" or 
"authoritarian" state will not have this characteristic, 
because neither enjoys an environment of sustained 
democratic discourse which re-negotiates the boundaries. 
Therefore this liberal virtue of "tolerance" needs to be 
cultivated and exercised if it is to constitute a citizen's 
character. Thus this second component (liberal virtue), 
becomes dependent upon the first (democratic discourse), as 
this virtue requires a method or system to create a 
"tolerant" environment for its development.
A concept of toleration which contains these components 
is one which is uniquely compatible with liberalism. 
Analogous to the parameters of a coin, this concept of 
liberalism is in the middle, comprising the area between the 
two extreme positions: "thin" permissiveness and "thick"
authoritarianism. As I have argued, a concept of toleration 
requires boundaries and an active democratic discourse; if 
either of these are lacking, then it cannot be regarded as a 
viable concept of toleration. But what is more important 
than these requirements is how they interact. Both the 
"permissive" and "authoritarian" concepts of toleration 
contain boundaries, but these boundaries become meaningless
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since they are arrived at deus ex machina. These boundaries 
do not create a liberalism which will constitute toleration 
as a significant characteristic of the citizen. Since both 
"permissiveness" and "authoritarianism" lack this democratic 
discourse, the boundaries which are created do not lead to a 
concept of liberalism which requires its citizens to 
practice toleration. Rather, citizens are only required to 
be "passive" and "endure" according to the boundaries 
derived from the non-negotiable principles of "harm" and 
"order". It is this interactive effect between these two 
components which creates a concept of toleration which is 
truly liberal, and as I have argued, constitutes the 
philosophical underpinnings of a tolerant society.
Conclusion
The role of toleration is central to the history of 
liberal thought. The Enlightenment brought the Western World 
liberalism through recognition that there was no "universal" 
conception of the good. If it is the right of rational man 
to discern for himself which conception of the good to 
follow, then these different conceptions of the good must be 
allowed to compete. This requires allowing competing 
conceptions of the good to attract followers through 
persuasion, not force, as Locke argued. Thus, varying 
conceptions of the good must be tolerated in a liberal 
state.
The role of toleration in liberalism has been shown to 
be a complex relationship. Just as there are competing 
conceptions of the good, there are competing concepts of 
toleration. These different concepts of toleration are best 
understood when placed on a continuum, with the two extremes 
creating a "thin" and "thick" liberalism respectively. These 
concepts of toleration were examined and shown to contain 
deficiencies which made them ill-suited to liberalism. Since 
these two concepts were deficient, a third, or "active" 
concept of toleration was examined.
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The "active" position of toleration, I argued, is 
uniquely compatible with liberalism. The essential 
components of this concept of toleration are: 1) two
boundaries which establish a range of "tolerance", and 2) a 
sustained, active, democratic discourse which creates these 
boundaries and continually re-negotiates them.. The first 
component is essential because not all conceptions of the 
good are legitimate in liberal thought. There are some 
conceptions of the good which may be proscribed in 
liberalism; thus this concept of toleration does not contain 
unlimited "tolerance". The way in which these boundaries are 
established comprises the second component.
The boundaries of what is to be tolerated are created 
by a sustained, active, democratic discourse. The boundaries 
are continually re-negotiated through this discourse, and 
most importantly, it partly takes place within the structure 
of a democratic regime. This component reinforces the 
democratic structure of liberalism and works within it to 
create these boundaries. A concept of toleration which 
contains these two components results in the creation of a 
citizen who is tolerant, one who "tolerates" conceptions of 
the good that are within this range of "tolerance". 
Furthermore, a citizen who is tolerant will participate in 
the democratic dialogue which continually re-negotiates what 
is to be "tolerated". This will entail deciding upon the 
norms and what conceptions of the good are intolerable. The
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result of this participation in the democratic dialogue and 
decision making concerning the boundaries of toleration is 
that the character of the citizens will be constituted in 
some significant degree by this experience. Thus these two 
components create a concept of toleration which is 
compatible with liberalism. This liberal virtue is dependent 
upon a concept of toleration which contains these two 
components. It is also dependent upon this concept of 
toleration for its survival. These components have an 
interactive effect and re-enforce the principles of liberal 
thought, and develop and cultivate the idea of competing 
conceptions of the good.
The two components of this concept of toleration are 
dependent upon each other to maintain its compatibility with 
liberalism. The debate creates meaningful boundaries of 
toleration debated by the polis; and this debate creates a 
liberal virtue which encourages tolerance. The "thin" 
permissive and "thick" authoritarian concepts of liberalism 
have been shown to be sufficiently deficient to require an 
examination of another concept of liberalism. But this third 
concept of liberalism, a middle concept, is not without its 
deficiencies. As it is dependent upon this liberal virtue to 
create boundaries of toleration, it does not protect against 
excesses, e.g. tyranny of the majority. Thus it is dependent 
upon the nurturing of this tolerant environment to protect 
against intolerance.
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